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The creation of the UMP after the 2002 presidential election began a new cycle for
the French Right. It can be characterized as the refoundation of a party by merger.
The reasoning behind the partial unification of the parties of the Right can be
understood only in terms of the hybrid nature of the French institutional system.
The merger proceeded from a long-established system of cooperation at the
legislative level, but the main motivation was the restoration of Jacques Chirac’s
authority over both his political camp and the institution of the presidency. The
real test that this new party will face is the selection of a single presidential
candidate. Although the party is not yet fully institutionalized, it is possible to
identify changes that are already in effect and others that the new organization may
potentially introduce. The merger was achieved through financial centralization, an
element that distinguishes the UMP from previous electoral coalitions; it entails
distributing positions according to various principles of representation and raises
the question of how to institute pluralism and possibly, accommodate ideological
diversity within the party.
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Introduction
The presidential and legislative elections of 2002 began a new cycle for the
French Right. Not only did the Right return to power — for the first time
with a guaranteed minimum 5-year mandate — but with a new party, the
UMP. Created on 23 April 2002, after the first round of the presidential
election, as the Union pour la Majorite´ Pre´sidentielle, the new organization’s
first aim was to put forward a joint list of candidates, committed to
supporting the president for the June legislative election. That election gave
the UMP an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly, with 465
deputies (out of 577) either belonging to, or allied with, the party. At its
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founding conference on 17 November 2002, the party renamed itself the
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (Haegel, 2002; Ponceyri, 2002; Knapp,
2003). With so much still unsettled and since key questions remain
unanswered, this article will not judge the record of the UMP or gauge
how much it has changed the French political system, but it will address the
significance of this change.
It is first necessary to define the change that occurred. It cannot be classified
as a process of ‘continual change’ (Panebianco, 1988, 243) even though UMP’s
creation might be seen as illustrative of longer-term evolutions of the French
party system, such as the disappearance of Gaullism, Europeanization (Cole,
2003) or the reinforcement of party cartelization. In particular, two
characteristics of cartelization (Katz and Mair, 1995, 17) were central to the
creation of the UMP: the ‘interpenetration of party and state’ (in accordance
with the tradition on the French right, the UMP is the result of the presidential
logic of the system) and the ‘pattern of inter-party collusion’ (the UMP was
created in order to contain extreme right). All the same, the transformation
was, strictly speaking, a ‘fundamental change’ which modified the ‘organiza-
tional order’ (Panebianco, 1988, 243) insofar as it encompassed both symbolic
and organizational dimensions, including the party name, its constituent
components, its statutes, and its ‘dominant coalition’ (Panebianco, 1988). In
this context, the birth of the UMP will be characterized as the refoundation of
a party by merger.
The main issue discussed in the literature on party change is the question of
the incentives to change (Panebianco, 1988; Harmel and Janda, 1994; Rioux,
2001). To the extent that parties are conservative institutions, it is necessary to
look closely at the conditions of any transformation. Here, it will be argued
that the creation of the UMP cannot be understood without taking into
account institutional imperatives and, more precisely, the need to connect the
legislative and presidential aspects of the political system. That said, structural
explanation of this sort needs to be placed in the appropriate situational
context. In this regard, the creation of the UMP can only be understood
against the background of the right’s defeat at the 1997 legislative election (an
external stimulus) which put Chirac’s leadership under pressure (an internal
stimulus) and the 2002 presidential election which made it easier for right-wing
politicians to rally to the UMP.
The last part of this article will identify what is at work in this merger and
what kind of ‘innovations’ (Appleton and Ward, 1997) it is likely to bring
about. Although caution clearly must be exercised in this regard, we will pay
attention to three types of internal organizational changes: what has already
changed (financial centralization), what is in the process of changing (sharing
of party posts) and what may change or could have changed (pluralism
organized inside the party).
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The Refoundation of a Party by Merger
To describe what is at stake in the creation of the UMP, two dimensions of the
phenomenon must be distinguished analytically: the birth of the party
represents both the refoundation of a party and a merger.
The refoundation of a party
In hindsight, the reaction to the shock generated by the success of Jean-Marie
Le Pen in the first round of the 2002 presidential election took two forms. On
the Left it led immediately to a series of demonstrations. By contrast, on the
Right the first reaction was the creation of a new party. The formation of the
UMP was announced immediately after the first round of the election. While
the creation of the UMP was not a direct result of the first round of the 2002
presidential election, one should not be too quick to conclude that the two are
completely unrelated. The creation of a party as a response to crisis is
characteristic of the culture of the French Right. To put it simply, in a crisis the
Left takes to the streets, while the Right creates a new party to defend political
institutions or the political establishment. This cultural trait may appear
paradoxical since the French Right — and particularly the Gaullist Right —
generally adopts a critical stance towards political parties, yet it also has a
marked propensity for creating new parties. In this aspect, the refoundation of
an existing party is perfectly consistent with that tradition (Charlot, 1969;
Donegani and Sadoun, 1992).
The history of the French Right is punctuated with examples of the
refoundation of political parties (Lavau, 1988). The propensity for changing
names and for making a great show of these changes is particularly strong
among Gaullist organizations, but until recently these events have always been
presented as a return to the roots of Gaullism (Haegel, 1990). In the case of the
UMP, this time however, any such reference has virtually disappeared.1 This
time, several advertising agencies were consulted for a view to on choice of the
name and logo of the new entity. After considering and discarding ‘Union’ and
the Italian-inspired ‘Maison bleue’, the party put two proposals to a vote by its
members. The first involved keeping the initials UMP and simply changing the
component words of the acronym; the second was to call the new organization
‘Union Populaire’. At the founding convention on 17 November 2002, members
opted for the first of those proposals. The acronym UMP now stood for ‘Union
pour un Mouvement Populaire’. In addition, a charter of values, statutes and
internal regulations were also approved by the party members.2 Even though
the UMP leadership rarely draws attention to the European echo contained in
the word ‘populaire’ (reference to the European parliamentary group is never
explicit), Europe was at the centre of the founding conference. Guests included
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Jose´-Maria Aznar, the Spanish Prime Minister and leader of the Partido
Popular, Angela Merkel, the leader of the German CDU, and the Portuguese
Prime Minister, Jose´ Manuel Duraro Barroso.3 In the restructuring of the
French Right, Europeanization was thus, clearly emphasized, with reference to
Europe even playing a central role in the symbolism surrounding the
refoundation of the party. On the whole, the founders of the UMP saw it as
a great conservative party along the lines of the German CDU/CSU or the
Partido Popular of Spain; the British Conservative Party, given its difficulties,
was not held up as a model nearly so often.
Merger
The UMP has incorporated the former Rassemblement pour la Re´publique
(RPR), the Gaullist party founded in December 1976 by Jacques Chirac
(Offerle´, 1984; Knapp, 1996), De´mocratie Libe´rale (DL), a one-time
component of the UDF (Hanley, 1999) but which left the confederation in
1998, the Parti Radical, also formerly of the UDF, and the Centre National des
Inde´pendants (CNI), a group of small right-of-centre parties created under the
Third and Fourth Republics and belonging to the UDF. The Rassemblement
pour la France (RPF), a party created by Philippe de Villiers and Charles
Pasqua and representing the nationalist or ‘sovereignist’ movement on the
French Right, was not a founding member of the UMP, but individually and
locally, most of its members supported the new party. The same was true of the
members of the Droite Libe´rale et Chre´tienne (DLC) created by Charles Millon.
Those elements of the UDF that, along with the party’s leader, Franc¸ois
Bayrou, refused to join the UMP embarked on a strategy of opposition inside
the majority. Although officially part of the majority (one UDF minister,
Gilles de Robien, served in the first government of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre
Raffarin), the UDF rump increasingly manifested its opposition internally to
the UMP, first by successfully running its own candidate against the UMP in
the Yvelines by-election in December 2002, then by abstaining on the vote to
pass the revenue element of the 2004 budget revenue vote in the National
Assembly in October 2003 and also by choosing to run separate candidates in
16 of the 22 metropolitan regions at the 2004 regional elections. Here, the UDF
won around 11 per cent of the votes, while UMP won 23 per cent.
Even though the process of unification was incomplete, it was still possible to
talk of a new party cycle on the Right because the process of fragmentation
that characterized the preceding period had been stopped. That process was
particularly manifest in the 1990s and could be measured by two indicators.
The first was the proliferation of ‘other Right’ candidates, that is, dissidents
not officially included in the dominant coalition. The number of ‘other Right’
candidates grew from 414 in the legislative election of 1978 to 479 in 1993 and
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to 945 — almost double — in 1997. The second indicator can be found in the
number of divisions affecting parties of the Right. Since 1991 there have been a
series of splits on the French Right (Evans, 2003), hitting the loosely bound
UDF particularly hard (Sauger, 2003).4 Indeed, the split in the UDF was a
prerequisite for the subsequent merger of non-Gaullist parties into the UMP.
Incentives to Change: Institutional Imperatives
The chronology of events leading up to the creation of the UMP does not allow
a causal link to be established between the result of the first round of the 2002
presidential election and the creation of the new party. In other words, the
UMP may have existed without the shock of this particular result. This is
because attempts to unite the parties on the Right have a long history and did
not begin on 21 April 2002. In fact, the story began in 1988, after the defeat of
Jacques Chirac in the presidential election of that year; since then, injunctions,
incantations and attempts to forge a united Right have never ceased. To
understand the restructuring of the French Right one must start from the
familiar foundations, which are the institutions of the Fifth Republic. Given
that the Fifth Republic is at once a multi-party and a semi-presidential system
that imposes both presidential and parliamentary constraints, parties must
have two objectives (Lawson, 1981). At least, two main ‘structures of
opportunity’ (Schlesinger, 1991) exist and party change are determined by
the necessity to be adapted to this environmental order (Appleton and Ward,
1993). They must adapt to both the presidential and parliamentary imperatives
in the system and devise systems of cooperation at both levels. Obviously there
is a structural hierarchy in place, and the presidential imperative predominates.
But there is also a degree of autonomy and it would be wrong to understate the
effects of the legislative imperative. Be that as it may, the two imperatives are
not perfectly connected and it is essential to examine the gap between them, in
order to understand the system of cooperation devised by the Right.
Legislative and presidential systems of cooperation
Before the creation of the UMP there were two systems of cooperation between
the parties of the Right. For every legislative election since 1981, a coalition of
the two main parties, the RPR and the UDF, was formed, even in 1986 when
proportional representation was introduced (Duhamel, 1986). The aim was to
select the maximum number of joint candidates. Pursuit of that aim led to
increasing specialization and institutionalization. Gradually a small team
devoted to this work took shape within each party. On the eve of every election
the same people met to hand out endorsements and negotiate the number of
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official primaries approved by the leadership of the two parties. Knowledge of
election data and precedents had made them experts in this form of
negotiation. At the same time, rules governing negotiation were established,
chief among them being the principle of giving precedence to incumbents,
known as prime au sortant (Ware, 1996): every incumbent could expect to be
renominated without difficulty. However, two new criteria — age and gender
— emerged in recent years. The oldest sitting deputies (those over 70) were
asked to step aside. But new gender equity legislation (Mossuz-Lavau, 2002)
changed old habits even more drastically by requiring parties to field an equal
number of male and female candidates. In reality, old habits die hard,
particularly within the parties of the Right. In the last parliamentary election,
the UMP could not meet the parity objective set by law: only 20% of its
candidates were women and the new party suffered a substantial cut
(approximately one-third) in its public campaign funding. It is no wonder,
then, that the search for potential women candidates for public office and the
creation of training to help prepare those women, often with no election
experience, to enter politics, became a priority within parties. Along with
precedence for incumbents there was a second rule, less well known but also
less frequently applied, known as droit de suite, or right of succession or
continuation. In cases where an incumbent was not running for reelection, the
idea was that the electoral district would remain reserved for the party holding
it. Within the UDF, a confederative structure, the same principle of respecting
the balance of power was followed as candidates were chosen according to the
relative weight of each of the party’s component parts. These rules reflected a
system firmly anchored in a network of notables and marked by a desire to
maintain the status quo. For voters, this type of cooperation served to blur
voting choices, or more precisely party labels (the personal appeal of
candidates was an element on which voters could base their choice). The
electoral coalition generally implied agreement on a minimum joint platform,
even if this did not mean across-the-board standardization (of campaign
material in particular).
The system of cooperation in legislative elections was thus very old and
relatively institutionalized (with its rules, its precedents, its professional
negotiators, etc.). And it can be said that there was a system to regulate
competition, even though the system was imperfect, as evidenced regularly by
dissent, the proliferation of ‘other Right’ candidacies and the fact that until
recently, despite provisions in party statutes, dissidents were rarely disciplined.
In any case, the existence and severity of disciplinary measures were subject to
widely varying interpretations, and dissidents were generally brought back into
the fold once elected.
In the presidential arena the situation was radically different. Only the so-
called normative rules (Bailey, 1969) were put in place. They were supposed to
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ensure ‘loyal’ behaviour between partners/rivals. The contests between Jacques
Chirac and Raymond Barre in 1988, and between Jacques Chirac and Edouard
Balladur in 1995, were thus punctuated by calls for adherence to a code of
conduct, which were of course violated regularly. Beyond those fragile
normative rules, no real system of cooperation existed. Deals were clearly
based on the alliances observed but those deals were most often the result of
informal negotiations, flowing largely from personal relationships. In any case,
the pattern of defections and alliances could not be viewed exclusively in party
terms: in 1988 as in 1995, party divisions did not explain entirely how the
contest was organized. In 1988, prominent UDF members supported Jacques
Chirac as early as the first round, and some Gaullists formed an association
backing Raymond Barre (Legavre, 1990). In 1995, the competition was even
more opaque in that both candidates were from the RPR (Haegel, 1995). In
2002, the candidates were the clearest reflection yet of party divisions but
analysis of their support revealed a much more complex picture in as much as a
significant portion of UDF and DL parliamentarians had decided to back
Jacques Chirac as early as the first round.5 Considering the Right’s inability to
adapt its organization to the logic of the presidential contest, it can be argued
that the French Right was not totally ‘presidentialized’. The case of the RPR
perfectly exemplifies this argument: the party has always been reluctant to
implement rules relating to the selection of a presidential candidate on the
grounds of its belief in the need for a direct and personal link between the
President and the nation.
The two restructuring models
The defeat of Jacques Chirac in the presidential election of 1988 ushered in a
period of internal challenges to his leadership. It also raised among the parties
of the Right the question of how best to organize competition for the
presidency in the context of the National Front’s increasing success.
Dysfunctions, or at least what were perceived as such, motivated change, in
order to avoid division. In simple terms, two types of solution were considered:
holding primaries in order to select a joint presidential candidate, or building a
structure common to all parties of the Right. Each of those options was based
on one of the two aforementioned systems of cooperation.
The first solution consisted in reorganizing the presidential contest, in other
words fixing what was not working. Debate over the candidate nomination
process referred back to the institutional foundations of the presidency
(Lagroye, 1992).6 The primaries were presented as means of continuing the
institutional legacy of General de Gaulle, who in 1962 had tried to broaden the
popular base of the presidency. In fact, the idea of primaries was first raised in
November 1989 by Charles Pasqua, then became a proposal drawn up in June
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1990 by a group calling itself L’Association des primaires a` la franc¸aise, and then
a charter adopted in June 1991 by the Union Pour la France (UPF), a structure
set up to coordinate the UDF and the RPR. Enjoying a not inconsiderable
lifespan — from 1988 to 1994, almost the length of a presidential term of office
— even if it surfaced only sporadically, the issue of primaries raised three points
of contention. The first concerned defining the population that would take part
in the process of selecting a joint candidate. The original text called for parity
between elected representatives and voters, that is, a single electoral college.
This idea was contested by the UDF which, owing to its local power base,
favoured limiting participation to elected representatives. The second point of
contention was the appointment of officials who would monitor procedures and
validate results. The third point concerned the procedure in the event of an early
presidential election, and it was over this point that the main rift between the
UDF and RPR occurred in November 1994.7
The second solution posited that the restructuring of the Right should be
based on what worked, namely the legislative system of cooperation. It was on
that foundation, and therefore principally with members of the National
Assembly, that more solid joint structures (initially confederative (Balladur,
1988) then organic (Balladur, 1999)) were to be erected, of a less improvised
nature than the electoral coalitions formed in the past. This approach had been
advocated since 1988 by Edouard Balladur and been taken up in 1993 by
Vale´ry Giscard d’Estaing. After the defeat of the Right in the legislative
election of 1997, a first attempt was launched, beginning with the creation of a
joint parliamentary committee followed by the establishment of a confed-
erative structure, L’Alliance, founded in May 1998. This was indeed a
centralized8 and confederative initiative based on a revolving chairmanship,
and respecting the proportional representation of the founding parties in
collective bodies.9 Its failure soon became evident in the clear disenchantment
resulting first, in October 1998, in the election of Christian Poncelet (RPR)
over Rene´ Monory (UDF) as Speaker of the Senate, and then in the decision of
the UDF to run candidates against the RPR/DL list in the European elections
of 1999. A second attempt was made with the launch of Alternance 2002,
rechristened Union en Mouvement (UEM). Contrary to the previous initiative,
it did not present itself as a system of coordination at the top, instead it
promoted the idea of a rapprochement ‘from the bottom up’ and a
decentralized structure. Thus a call for unity in Le Figaro on 24 November
2000, signed by 364 of the 462 right-of-centre parliamentarians (including over
half of the UDF caucus), extolled the ‘grass-roots Republic’ and the ‘secret of
unity’ which had allowed ‘the national opposition to be the local majority in
many regions, departments and towns for the past twenty years’, and pointed
the finger at senior party officials, arguing that political wisdom was to be
found ‘beyond Paris ring road’.
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The logic of UMP’s birth
To understand the logic of UMP’s birth, one must answer two questions: On
what model was the UMP built? Why did a merger occur in 2002, whereas
attempts to forge a united Right prior to this time failed, despite repeated
efforts?
The creation of the UMP occurred at the intersection of the legislative and
presidential imperatives (De Bujadoux and Gambotti, 2003). The main
evidence for this argument is related to the role of agency in the creation of
the UMP. The UMP was largely the work of Je´roˆme Monod. Chirac’s friend
and adviser, Monod was the former ‘secre´taire ge´ne´ral’ of the RPR in 1976 and
CEO of the ‘Lyonnaise des Eaux’ company. He joined Chirac’s team at the
Elyse´e in 2000 with the task of setting up or maintaining the President’s
networks. Monod was the key element behind the scenes, but on the stage two
other groups were also instrumental. The association Dialogue et Initiative was
founded in 1999 by four members of Alain Juppe´’s: Michel Barnier and
Dominique Perben (RPR), Jacques Barrot (UDF) and Jean-Pierre Raffarin
(DL). Their aim was to promote a common platform for Chirac’s candidacy at
the 2002 presidential election. Another association Alternance 2002 was created
by three rank-and-file deputies, Dominique Bussereau (DL), Renaud Dutreil
(UDF) and Herve´ Gaymard (RPR). This initiative was part of a bottom-up
process. It was designed to encourage a new generation of political leaders and
emphasized a local system of cooperation.
Against this background, why did a merger occur in 2002? The incentive to
bring about change was closely linked to the Right’s 1997 electoral defeat —
and it might be remembered that defeat is a standard factor that brings about
party change (Harmel and Janda, 1994). This defeat put Chirac’s leadership
under pressure. As a result, he had to widen his base of political support, not
only because every president has to do so but because his authority over the
Right had diminished more by the negative impact of the failed dissolution
than by the charges of corruption that were levelled against him.
Paradoxically, 1997 was such a rout in the legislative field that it offered
the necessity and the opportunity for relevant changes. In short, the 1997
defeat was so bad that it brought about a demand for Chirac’s authority to
be restored and it made Chirac take the issue of reforming the Right more
seriously. What is more, in order to do so, he could no longer rely, as before,
solely on the RPR. Divisions between ‘chiraquiens’ and ‘balladuriens’, Juppe´’s
failure as Prime Minister and the election of the ‘non chiraquien’ Se´guin at the
head of the party meant that the RPR could only be part of Chirac’s
strategy.
The result of the first round of the 2002 presidential election needs to be
placed in this wider context. What is clear is that from an electoral standpoint
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(Chiche and Dupoirier, 2003) Chirac’s poor performance in the first round of
the presidential election was more a function of the success of the Extreme
Right, rather than the proliferation of candidates on the mainstream Right. So,
there is no doubt that Chirac’s score in the first round of the 2002 election was
mediocre: he received 5,386,000 votes, barely more than he received in his first
try for the presidency in 1981, and less than he received in 1988 and 1995.10
Moreover, at the first ballot of the 2002 presidential election, Jacques Chirac
was running against four other right-wing candidates: Alain Madelin, the DL
candidate, representing the free-market stream, Franc¸ois Bayrou, the UDF or
centrist candidate, Christine Boutin, a UDF member of the National
Assembly, representing the conservative Catholic stream and Corine Lepage,
a former Minister of the Environment in the Juppe´ government, a right-of-
centre environmentalist. Even so, despite his poor performance and the
proliferation of candidates, Chirac was able to win a larger share of the total
vote of the mainstream Right than in previous presidential elections. In other
words, while the defeat of Lionel Jospin could be seen as an effect of the
proliferation of candidates on the Left (Jaffre´, 2003), the same phenomenon
did not occur on the Right. In this context, the first round of the 2002
presidential election showed that Chirac was now the undisputed leader of the
mainstream Right, which encouraged the formation of the UMP immediately
after the first round of the election.
Organizational Changes
From an institutional standpoint, changes such as the ‘quinquennat’ and the
reversal of the electoral calendar whereby the presidential election precedes the
legislative election, reinforce the connection between presidential and
legislative imperatives of the system. All the same, the UMP has not yet
succeeded in connecting these two imperatives insofar as it has yet to resolve
the question of how the party’s presidential candidate is to be selected. Until
this issue is resolved, the UMP cannot be considered to be fully institutiona-
lized. Moreover, not only has the issue yet to be resolved, it has not even been
addressed. The party statutes make no mention of the procedure for selecting a
presidential candidate. This omission is indicative of the importance and
difficulty of the issue. In addition, the rivalry between Alain Juppe´ and Nicolas
Sarkozy is so manifest that an exceptional measure was adopted concerning the
election of the UMP chairman. In theory, the chairman and his team are to be
elected for 4 years, but, at the demand of Sarkozy, the initial term was reduced
to 2 years coinciding with the founding period. This means that another
election must be held in 2004, making the leadership of the party a ‘live’ issue
once again.
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In view of the failure to resolve such questions, one could reasonably
argue that nothing has really changed and that there is no significant
difference between the UMP and the coalitions previously fashioned, under
various labels, by the RPR and the UDF.11 At this early stage of the
UMP’s existence, much remains uncertain and only the boldest would try to
predict the future. All the same, it is not true that nothing has really
changed: some elements have already changed and others may be in the
process of changing. It is those actual and potential changes that we will
examine now.
What has changed already
The coalitions formed by the RPR and the UDF were exclusively systems of
cooperation aimed at achieving electoral objectives. The UMP is more than
that because it is based on a joint parliamentary caucus. This point is crucial
in that it has financial consequences. The law provides for public campaign
funding to be distributed to organizations running candidates based on two
criteria: the number of votes received by the party in the first round, and the
number of sitting members in its parliamentary caucus.12 Formerly
candidates ran under two banners (the coalition’s and their own party’s)
and, more importantly, formed separate parliamentary groups once elected;
public funding was therefore allotted to each component of the coalition.
Now that the UMP is the only publicly displayed banner, there is a single
caucus and public funding goes to the UMP and not to its founding
components (the former parties). In other words, the party merger was made
possible by financial centralization. This aspect of the merger is essential if
one recalls that, for instance, there was no financial centralization in the
former UDF, a confederation, and each component had its own budget. To
be convinced of the importance of this aspect, one need only measure the
efforts made by UMP promoters to create a joint parliamentary caucus.
After the first round of the presidential election a small team was set up to
persuade each sitting member personally to adopt the UMP label. The team
called candidates systematically to ask them to register with the prefecture
under the UMP banner, and to send a duplicate of the registration to Party
Headquarters so that real control could be exercised. At the same time, it
offered candidates, if necessary, an advance of 10,000 towards their campaign
expenses.
What is in the process of changing
While the merger was brought about through financial centralization, it
became necessary to share party positions. Responsibilities within the
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organization had to be distributed among representatives of the different
components of the new party. The inherent difficulty of such a task is evident
and manifested in the case of the UMP by the fact that it took over 1 year to
complete. Only then was the list of the heads of the federations made public
and officials at the constituency level elected.13
The balance of power within the UMP clearly favours the former RPR. The
dominance of the RPR can be seen in several respects. Over half of the deputies
are from the RPR, approximately 20 per cent from the UDF and 15 per cent
from DL. In terms of party members the RPR’s hegemony is even more
pronounced since it was the only organization on the Right that, under the
rather undemanding French criteria, could boast a substantial number of party
members. Today the UMP claims some 130,000 members and acknowledges
that roughly two-thirds are ex-RPR. Turning to the party bureaucracy, some
120 people are on the permanent staff at UMP headquarters. A sizeable
number of them were members of Chirac’s presidential campaign staff and
over half had already worked for the RPR, but a good many, mainly young
people, had been recruited specifically for the campaign and stayed on to staff
the administrative structures of the new organization. And finally, the UMP
leadership is composed of the triumvirate of Alain Juppe´, former RPR party
chairman, mayor of Bordeaux and former Prime Minister, Jean-Claude
Gaudin (ex-DL), Mayor of Marseilles, and Douste-Blazy (ex-UDF), Mayor of
Toulouse.
But although the supremacy of the former RPR is evident, the merger
imperative made it necessary to share positions. Two principles were
apparently applied. At the local level the existing balance of power was, on
the whole, respected: an area where one of the former parties was dominant
was represented within the UMP by someone originally from that same party.
In other words, a territorial division according to the former component
parties was applied, often causing considerable tension and inevitable
frustration. At the national level, positions were distributed on a different
principle, as evidenced by the composition of the new ‘Bureau Politique’, the
party national executive (20 June, 2003). Thirty of the 80-odd members of that
body were elected by the 1,500 members of the National Council. In that first
election there was no actual contest: a carefully negotiated single list was put to
a vote. That list applied the twin principles of parity and representation of the
different ideological streams. The principle of gender parity required by law for
the selection of candidates was adopted voluntarily within the party frame-
work. The UMP Political Office was thus staffed by an equal number of men
and women. But the principle of representing the various political leanings
within the new party was also followed by drawing up the list and involved
extensive bargaining. The political sympathies represented — or ‘sensibilities’,
to use the official parlance — included not only those of the former component
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parties (RPR, DL and UDF) but also those of the teams attached to individual
leaders (the people around Nicolas Sarkozy, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, etc.) and the
most clearly defined ideological streams (such as the sovereignist or free-
market elements). This distribution of party positions at the national level
immediately raises the question of the introduction of pluralism, a potential
change connected with the establishment of the UMP.
What may change or could have changed
The idea of creating a single party was based on the realization that ideological
differences on the Right were not reflected in party divisions. The ideological
transformation of the political stream claiming to follow the Gaullist tradition
had indeed largely blurred the lines between the two main components of the
French Right (Re´mond, 1981). The neoconservative shift of the RPR
beginning in 1981 (Baudouin, 1990, 1983), followed by its more difficult
acceptance of European integration, brought the UDF and the RPR closer
together ideologically. But this does not mean that all differences on the Right
had disappeared. It would be more accurate to say that differences still existed
but were not perfectly reflected by party fragmentation (Chiche et al., 2002).
For example, there were political figures on the Right who had largely
embraced economic liberalism, but not all belonged to the same party. Merging
a set of components marked by different party histories, cultures and a certain
ideological heterogeneity, necessitated UMP leaders to find a way to organize
that diversity and to manufacture homogeneity. Two types of solutions were
considered: the first was to organize the plurality along territorial — more
specifically, regional — lines. Urging greater decentralization, a certain number
of leaders of the Right, among them Jean-Pierre Raffarin, favoured
regionalizing party structures and activities to the extent of developing
different programs for each region. This idea, a departure from the RPR’s very
centralized way of operating, was inspired by the structure of parties such as
the German CDU. The other solution involved finding a way to represent
ideological pluralism within the various bodies of the new organization. This
solution was enshrined in the party statutes, ‘movements’, in the terminology
adopted, representing ‘the diversity of political, historical, philosophical and
social sensibilities that drive French politics and compose the UMP’ (article
15). To be recognized, a ‘movement’ had to be endorsed by at least 10
parliamentarians from different departments (mirroring the conditions for
presidential candidacy) and receive 10 per cent of votes cast at the party
conference (article 16).
Rightly characterized as a sea change in the party culture of the Right, an
operating structure based on ideological streams is very unlikely to be
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implemented even though it is contained in the UMP statutes. The conference
held to institute these ‘movements’ was adjourned by Jean-Pierre Raffarin,
who feared public exposure of divisions within the governing party, and
Nicolas Sarkozy, who was opposed from the outset to an initiative inconsistent
with his strategy of rallying support beyond the internal ideological divisions of
the Right. This introduction in the party statutes of an operating principle
incorporating the different ideological streams would have represented one of
the primary innovations of this organization because it was, in many respects,
foreign to the traditional organizational culture of the Right, as was the
difficulty of performing the graft attests. But to what extent can one say that
the French organizations of the Right were resistant to party pluralism? In the
case of the UDF, managing pluralism was certainly a basic tenet of the
organization. But its very status as a confederation meant that accommodating
the different ideological components was a precondition of its existence (cf.
supra) and, for the rest, party regulation functioned more by compromise and
backroom arrangement than through public and institutionalized debate. As
for the RPR, its attachment to a plebiscite mentality, celebration of party
discipline and unanimity and personalization of authority characterize a party
model (Panebianco, 1988) little inclined towards pluralism and debate. In
recent years, it is true that there has been pressure within the RPR to
institutionalize pluralism. At the party conference of February 1990, a motion
was put to vote allowing the movement led by Charles Pasqua and Philippe
Se´guin to prove its support within the party. While this first manifestation of
pluralism reflected a personal rivalry between party figures, it also demon-
strated ideological differences.14 But resistance to the institution of pluralism
could be seen in the subsequent vote of confidence called by Jacques Chirac
himself, and by the refusal of Alain Juppe´ to organize the party by ideological
streams. The episode of February 1990 therefore looks more like an exception
than a starting point. Indeed, the motions put forward at the next party
conference were no longer structured horizontally around ideas, but according
to a bottom/top opposition (the party base against the executive). It could be
said that the absence of pluralism in the UDF resulted from the lack of
publicity given to debate and negotiation, while at the RPR it was due to the
promotion of unity and deference to authority. Today, although pluralism has
yet to be institutionalized, the different ideological movements have never-
theless gained a certain visibility. Two streams are truly organized within the
party framework: the ‘sovereignist’ movement led by Nicolas Dupont–Aignan,
a former RPR member who followed Charles Pasqua to the RPF, has formed
an association, Debout la Re´publique, aimed at ‘promoting Gaullist values’,
while the free-market stream boasts several structures, including clubs and
associations (La Droite Libre), as well as but also informal parliamentary
groups. Both of these streams ran candidates in the election for the party
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executive in November 2002 and are recognized as ‘sensibilities’ to be
represented.15
Conclusion
In the first 2 years of its existence the UMP has been put to test. The initial
project was to unify the right, and adapt to the presidential logic of the system.
By April 2004, these objectives had yet to be reached.
At the level of the party system, the purpose was indeed to unify the right.
This process is incomplete insofar as the UDF is still there and challenges the
UMP’s supremacy. From this viewpoint, the UDF’s result at the 2004 regional
election has to be analysed cautiously. On the one hand, UDF candidates failed
to outpoll the UMP and, most importantly of all, Franc¸ois Bayrou himself did
not do as well as he had hoped in Aquitaine. Consequently, this result would
weaken its leadership. On the other, the UMP’s claim to represent the totality
of the right was seriously challenged, even though the real test would occur not
at second-order election but at the next legislative election (Cole, 2003, 13).
Furthermore, one must keep in mind the fact that in 2002 the overwhelming
majority of UDF deputies were elected in constituencies where they did not
face a UMP challenger (Ponceyri, 2002) and that UMP could be tempted not
to do the same at the next legislative election.
At the intra-party level, the merger was justified by declining ideological
differences. This trend is not specific to France, since it has occurred across
Europe (Delwit, 2003), but in the French case it raises the question of the
trivialization of Gaullism. The swing towards economic liberalism by a
putative Gaullist party previously known for favouring greater state
intervention in the economy, and the risky choice of Europe by the former
RPR leaders, despite their party’s marked wariness regarding the mechanisms
of European integration, both served to accelerate the movement. In this
context, the merger is causing tensions, but most of all it means that the party
has to find a way to organize intra-party pluralism (institutionalization of
different ideological streams, introduction of internal debate, etc.) in the face of
the right-wing party culture that heretofore was unfamiliar with public
expressions of diversity. The success of the dual task of allowing pluralism and
forging unity must, in the end, be measured by the new party’s ability to mould
and accommodate its founding and now rallying ideological elements.
Notes
1 The last attempt to change the name of the RPR was made by Philippe Se´guin when he was
chairman of the party. In January 1998, he proposed reviving the name of the party founded in
1947 by de Gaulle, the RPF, but he gave up the idea in the face of party members’ support for
the name chosen by Jacques Chirac.
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2 The name ‘Union pour un Mouvement Populaire’ was adopted by a vote of 83.73 per cent, against
11.48 per cent for ‘Union populaire’. The emblem adopted (82.34 per cent) was a white oak on a
blue and red background.
3 One must remember that in the history of the French Right, the terms populaire and peuple were
used on several occasions: by the Fascist Right with the creation in the 1930s of the Parti
Populaire Franc¸ais of Doriot, by the Christian Democratic stream with the post-war creation of
theMouvement Re´publicain Populaire (MRP) and by the Gaullist movement with the creation in
1947 of the Rassemblement du Peuple Franc¸ais (RPF).
4 Under the banner ‘‘Combat pour les valeurs’’, an association led by Philippe de Villiers was
created in 1991 within the UDF. In 1994 that association became a party, the Mouvement Pour
la France (MPF). In 1998, Charles Million, elected president of the Rhoˆne–Alpes region with the
support of the National Front, created La Droite, which a year later became La Droite Libe´rale
et Chre´tienne (DLC). That same year, the conservative Parti Re´publicain (PR), led by Alain
Madelin, renamed itself De´mocratie Libe´rale (DL) and split with the UDF. In 1999, Charles
Pasqua founded the RPF with Philippe de Villiers; in the European elections it supplanted the
RPR/DL candidate list headed by Nicolas Sarkozy.
5 109 UDF and DL parliamentarians, according to press reports, called for voters to support
Jacques Chirac in the first round (Le Figaro: 27 February, 2002).
6 This line of argument was very prominent in internal RPR documents, which stated that: ‘in the
institutions of the Fifth Republic, pride of place among the different ballots belongs to the
presidential election. A united opposition can therefore become a reality only if significant
progress is made immediately in preparing for that major election. That is why the RPR believes
that devising a procedure allowing opposition parties to support a joint candidate, nominated
directly by the voters themselves, is a priority’. The motion was adopted by the National
Council on 5 May 1990.
7 The failing health of Franc¸ois Mitterrand made that a distinct possibility.
8 The Alliance was launched on 14 May 1998 by Philippe Se´guin (RPR), Franc¸ois Le´otard (UDF)
and Alain Madelin (DL).
9 The only departure from the confederative rule, as in the UDF, is the recognition of direct
memberships.
10 He had received 5,138,569 votes in 1981, 5, 884,000 votes in 1988, and 6,098,000 votes in 1995.
11 ‘Union pour une Nouvelle Majorite´’ in 1981, ‘Union du Rassemblement et du centre’ (URC) in
1988, ‘Union Pour la France’ (UPF) in 1993.
12 As provided by law, funding is based on the number of votes polled in the first round of the
legislative election (at h1.66 per vote) and on the number of deputies elected (with each deputy
bringing in h43,398 per year).
13 Each departmental federation has a Departmental Secretary, appointed by the Political Office at
the suggestion of the party chairman, after consultation with all parliamentarians from the
department, and a departmental committee composed of individuals elected by party members
and ex officio members.
14 The ideological differences underlying internal divisions revolve around free-market liberalism,
Europe and party organization. With regard to the party membership, the only data available
are from the survey conducted in February 1990: of representatives who voted for the Pasqua–
Se´guin motion and those who supported the Juppe´ motion. The survey suggests that opposition
between ideological streams is indeed rooted in political divisions over electoral alliance
strategies, party identity and the direction of the RPR (Habert, 1991).
15 Against Alain Juppe´, who received 79.42 per cent of votes cast (37,822), Nicolas Dupont-
Aignan, leader of the Sovereignist’ Movement within the UMP, polled 14.91 per cent and
Rachid Kaci ex-DL, head of the association ‘La Droite libre’, won 3.17 per cent; two other
candidates had significantly lower scores.
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